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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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1. AMBASSADOR THOMPSON'S VIEWS ON RECENT
COMMUNIST BLOC PRONOUNCEMENTS

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


Ambassador Thompson in Moscow believes party presidium member Furtseva's address on 26 November before a Moscow party meeting shows that a primary Soviet

objective during the recent high-level Communist meetings in Moscow was to obtain clear reacknowledgment of Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement by all Sino-Soviet bloc parties. Furtseva emphasized this theme at least five times, and declared that such recognition is important, "because revisionists in certain foreign Communist parties applied much effort to discredit the successes of the Soviet Union and to undermine the authority of our party."

Ambassador Thompson notes that one of the major aims of the Soviet leaders over the past year has been to restore the momentum given the international Communist movement by the February 1956 CPSU 20th party congress, but disrupted by the de-Stalinization campaign and the Hungarian revolt. Moscow has since been seeking means to prevent a repetition of situations in which foreign Communists were uncertain about the party line and even went so far in some instances as to criticize the USSR.

Ambassador Thompson believes that Moscow has clearly outmaneuvered Belgrade. Among Tito's potential allies, Mao was loud in his affirmation of Soviet leadership; Gomulka was apparently pleased with concessions on "national peculiarities"; while Togliatti was presumably reassured by affirmation of the doctrine of peaceful transition to Socialism and by the failure to revive any international Communist organization. In the ambassador's view, it is an open question whether Moscow will be able to keep the entire Communist movement in line, although the situation now tends to favor the Kremlin.



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2. YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS COOL

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Yugoslav-Soviet relations appear to have cooled distinctly since Zhukov's ouster. Belgrade has become increasingly disillusioned with the Soviet leadership, and Moscow has been treating Yugoslavia with reserve.

The French Foreign Ministry reported on 30 November that during a courtesy call, the new Yugoslav ambassador to Paris was quite definite in expressing President Tito's disenchantment with Khrushchev. He said that Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj had returned from Moscow with a "most unfavorable impression of Khrushchev and the general atmosphere." In what appears in part as an effort to redress Yugoslavia's balance between East and West, the ambassador added that Kardelj deeply resented Soviet attempts to push the Yugoslavs into following the Soviet line in a way "all too reminiscent of Cominform practices."

Major Moscow dailies carried noncommittal articles about Yugoslavia's national day on 29 November in contrast to the more general attention given to Albania's national holiday on the same date. Although the Yugoslav embassy's celebration in Moscow on this occasion was attended by Khrushchev and other top Soviet leaders, Soviet propaganda only noted the Yugoslav holiday in a polite but reserved fashion. The American embassy in Moscow views the "rather perfunctory" telegram Soviet President Voroshilov sent Tito in conjunction with the event as one "superficially correct" and as a reflection of present Yugoslav-Soviet relations in which "no great enthusiasm is apparent on either side."

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3. RUSSIANS REFUSE VISAS FOR TRANSIT OF EAST GERMANY

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The Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in another move probably designed to force the Western allies to deal directly with the East German regime, has refused to act on re-

cent applications from American embassy personnel in Warsaw for Soviet transit visas for travel in East Germany. In explanation of their refusal, Soviet officials stated they have no authorization from the East German government to issue transit visas. Although formerly most requests were granted within a week or 10 days, recent requests have been in for as long as two weeks without action.

Under four power agreements, the Russians are responsible for the documentation of official Allied personnel traveling in East Germany. The Soviet embassy in East Berlin, however, has issued visas permitting American officials to travel in East Germany on only two occasions since October 1956. The Russians, in refusing to issue visas, have hinted that approval would probably be granted if American requests were addressed directly to East German officials.

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4. BONN REFUSES TO CONTINUE PAYMENTS FOR BRITISH TROOPS

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Bonn's adamant refusal to negotiate on continuing payments to defray local expenses of British forces in Germany after 31 March 1958 has caused London to invoke special NATO and WEU provisions concerning relief of financial difficulties arising from stationing forces in other member countries. The dispute will raise anew the divisive issue of future British troop levels less than two weeks before the 16-18 December NATO meetings.

Bonn's attitude is much firmer than in previous years, when it accepted compromise arrangements for contributing to the support of all foreign troops in West Germany. Indicative of the new German concentration on building up the Bundeswehr was the expression by a responsible Foreign Ministry official of the greatest indifference regarding the presence or absence of British troops. Adenauer has recently shown alarm at the cost of the German build-up.

German intransigence, which may be expected to continue even if NATO studies point to the advisability of special aid to Britain, will probably lead London to consider further reductions of the 50,000-man force it planned to leave in Germany after March 1959. Presumably, London in any event will no longer offer to station in Germany the 5,000-man element of the British strategic reserve which it had linked to German agreement to pay \$140,000,000 in support costs for all British troops.

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6. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGLO-SAUDI RELATIONS

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Britain is pursuing efforts to resume diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in order to work toward a settlement of outstanding area problems. London has asked the Iraqis to explore Saud's views on the requisite preconditions during King Faysal's current visit to Riyadh.

King Saud has previously appeared interested, but his present attitude is unclear. Saud told the American ambassador on 24 November that "up to now Britain has done nothing to meet problems pending between us" and that he saw no point in resuming relations until it did so. British officials think, however, that Saud, not wishing to be isolated, will be more inclined to reach agreement if Anglo-Egyptian relations are re-established--as now appears likely.

The Buraimi Oasis, which has been occupied by British-led local forces since late 1955, remains the outstanding dispute. In September, the Saudis proposed through an intermediary four possible solutions, including the creation of a neutral zone in the Buraimi area.

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
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8. SHAH OF IRAN BECOMING DISILLUSIONED WITH BAGHDAD PACT

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The Shah, [redacted] has
[redacted] has
voiced his disillusionment with the Baghdad pact. He made thinly veiled threats that his country may withdraw from the pact's military committee unless it receives substantial military and financial assistance. In this connection he again pressed for American adherence to the pact.

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The Shah proposes to tell the Baghdad pact council meeting in January that without additional aid, Iran's forces cannot hold positions chosen by the pact's military committee and must accordingly develop plans limited to Iran's own defense.

Soviet activity in the Middle East and Soviet willingness to extend economic aid to Iran are factors inducing the Shah to intensify his pressure on the US for help. [redacted]

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